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This paper examines the agency cost of winner-picking in multidivision firms and
uses explicit incentive contracts to analyze the interaction between corporate head-
quarters’ investment and incentive policies. Winner-picking, i.e. the efficient re-
allocation of scarce resources in an internal capital market, adds an extra layer of
noise to the moral hazard problem of incentivizing division managers to produce
the resources that can then be redistributed. In particular, division managers with
strong future investment opportunities anticipate that headquarters will bail them
out should they fail to produce enough resources themselves. This reduces incen-
tives to create the resources in the first place with possible consequences for the
optimal investment policy. (JEL: G31, L25)
1 Introduction
The presence of large conglomerates is a dominant feature of advanced economies. In
1992, 88% of the 500 largest US public companies, producing three-quarters of the
output of all U.S. public companies, are conglomerates operating in more than one line
of business (Montgomery [1994]).
Within a conglomerate, corporate headquarters has the possibility to reallocate the
resources of one business segment to another i.e., to operate an internal capital market.
Lamont [1997] and Shin and Stulz [1998] provide evidence that conglomerates indeed
actively reallocate resources across divisions.
Alchian [1969], Williamson [1975] and, more recently, Stein [1997] argue that
the reallocation is efficient. They claim that a key advantage of conglomerate firms is
the value-enhancing reallocation of scarce resources across divisions, i.e. a ”smarter-
money” or ”winner-picking” effect. But this raises the question of why conglomerates
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2do then not trade at a premium compared to (a suitably chosen) portfolio of single-
division firms (Lang and Stulz [1994] and Berger and Ofek [1995] even document
a ”conglomerate discount”).1
One possible answer is that the reallocation of resources within a conglomerate is
not efficient. In Scharfstein and Stein [2000], corporate headquarters’ ownership
of assets makes it vulnerable to wasteful influence activities by division managers and
in Rajan, Servaes and Zingales [2000] corporate headquarters uses its allocative
authority to minimize wasteful bargaining among division managers. In both cases, cor-
porate headquarters does not maximize value but inefficiently cross-subsidizes divisions,
i.e. there is ”corporate socialism”. Maksimovic and Phillips [2002] and Khanna
and Tice [2001], however, produce evidence that is inconsistent with corporate social-
ism in that in both cases the reallocation of resources across divisions appears to be
efficient.
We therefore explore a second possibility: that the reallocation is efficient, i.e. that
there is winner-picking, but that winner-picking has a dark side to it. The starting point
of our analysis is that corporate headquarters needs to incentivize divisional managers to
produce the resources that it then reinvests efficiently. Our central assertion is that there
is a tension between headquarters’ investment and incentive policies. Winner-picking
adds noise to the moral hazard problem between corporate headquarters and divisional
managers.
The moral hazard problem between headquarters and division managers is a standard
one (and the same as in a single-division firm): headquarters does not know whether
good performance is due to managerial skill or sheer luck. Winner-picking in a multidivi-
sion firm adds an extra layer of noise because it is not possible to ascertain whether good
divisional performance is due to skill, luck or because headquarters bails out an unlucky
manager, whose division however has strong future investment opportunities, with re-
sources from another division. Managers of winning divisions have lower incentives since
they may be able to free-ride on the resources from losing divisions.
In our analysis, we initially assume that the incentive contract offered to a divisional
manager depends only on the performance of his own division, as prescribed by Holm-
stro¨m’s [1979] informativeness principle in the case without ex post intervention and
with uncorrelated output across divisions. Evidence suggests that such incentive con-
tracts are indeed common practice in multidivision firms (see for example Bushman,
Indjejikian and Smith[1995] and Wulf [2002]).
But once managerial effort has been incurred, headquarters has an incentive to inter-
vene ex post and to reallocate scarce resources to divisions with strong future investment
opportunities. Rational divisional managers anticipate the possibility of winner-picking.
In particular, the manager of a division with strong future investment opportunities
ends up working less. She knows that headquarters has an ex post incentive to real-
locate resources towards her. This reduces her incentives to create her own resources.
1Recent work questions the existence of a discount on econometric grounds. Finding a discount on
average may be driven by selection biases (e.g. Chevalier [2004], Campa and Kedia [2002] and
Graham, Lemmon and Wolf [2002]) or measurement error (e.g. Whited [2001]).
3The manager of a weak division, however, does not end up working less in our set-up,
even though he expects to lose resources. The reason is that headquarters can adjust his
incentive contract and compensate him for his loss by paying more when he does not lose
resources. Managers of losing divisions are simply paid more less often. Taken together,
the efficient reallocation of resources within a multidivision firm therefore increases the
incentive cost of producing those resources. Depending on the importance of the benefit
of winner-picking relative to its agency cost, a conglomerate may create or destroy value.
The incentive cost of winner-picking could be avoided by using more sophisticated
incentive schemes based on information about the performance of all the divisions of a
conglomerate. For example, a contract that pays all managers only when their divisions
succeed jointly does not create an extra agency cost.2 When all divisions succeed jointly,
then headquarters does not need to redistribute resources and managerial pay is trivially
independent of headquarters’ ex post intervention. But with such an incentive contract
headquarters may have incentives to strategically liquidate divisions in order to save on
managerial pay. In theory, taking fully into account the conflict between investment
decisions and managerial incentives, especially when there are many divisions, leads to
complex incentive contracts. In practice however, such complex contracts are rarely
observed (Bushman, Indjejikian and Smith [1995]). A simpler alternative may be
bonus pools that are distributed at headquarters’ discretion. Headquarters, in contrast
to outsiders, can observe which division has produced the resources that may then be
redistributed within the firm. Such bonus pools depend, however, on headquarters’
reputation of rewarding only successful managers and may be subject to collusion or the
kind of influence activities described in Scharfstein and Stein [2000] and Rajan,
Servaes and Zingales [2000].
Our analysis is related to Rotemberg and Saloner [1994] and Brusco and
Panunzi [2005] who both identify ex ante agency costs of ex post intervention in mul-
tidivision firms. In Rotemberg and Saloner [1994] divisional managers need to
develop ideas that headquarters can then implement. A manager can only be paid if
his own idea is implemented. Headquarters may fail to implement a manager’s idea
and instead use another idea generated elsewhere in the firm. This ex post intervention
lowers managers’ incentives to produce a valuable idea in the first place. Brusco and
Panunzi [2005] argue that winner-picking hurts ex ante incentives because managers of
divisions with weak investment opportunities lose private benefits. The private benefits
for a manager are specific to the resources of his division so that he cannot be adequately
compensated for losing them.3
Both models share the feature that the agency cost arises in losing divisions because
their manager cannot be compensated fully for the expropriation by headquarters. We
allow for explicit incentive contracts that can be used to compensate the manager of
a losing division. Instead, we identify an agency caused by free-riding of managers in
winning divisions. They cannot be punished for receiving resources.
2This assumes that managers are risk neutral. If they are risk averse, then a contract that pays
them only if they all succeed together may well be prohibitively costly.
3Gertner, Scharfstein and Stein [1994] and Aghion and Tirole [1997] analyze similar con-
flicts between ex post intervention and ex ante incentives in settings other than multidivision firms.
4Inderst and Laux [2005] show how ex post winner-picking can improve ex ante
incentives in a conglomerate when divisions are homogeneous. They focus on the in-
centive problem of generating future investment opportunities taking resources as given
while we focus on the incentive problem of generating resources taking future invest-
ment opportunities as given. The competition for scarce resources in their model gives
managers incentives to produce winning investment opportunities.4
Section 2 introduces the model and section 3 analyzes a portfolio of independent
single-division firms as a benchmark. Sections 4 and 5 examine the multidivision firms.
Section 4 considers the possibility that headquarters decides not redistribute resources
ex post. Section 5 considers redistribution (winner-picking). Section 6 compares results
from the previous sections to determine i) when headquarters prefers to pick winners
and ii) when the multidivision firm has a higher value than the portfolio of independent
single-division firms. Section 7 discusses the robustness of our results with respect to
alternative incentive schemes. Section 8 concludes.
2 The Model
Our model combines winner-picking and moral hazard in a multidivision firm. Head-
quarters maximizes value and owns all productive assets, but it has no expertise in
managing them, so that it must employ self-interested managers to run the divisions.
All parties are risk-neutral and the risk-free interest rate is normalized to zero.
To introduce the model, consider first a single-division firm. The model extends over
two periods, from t=0 to t=1 and from t=1 to t=2. If the manager exerts an unobserv-
able effort at cost c during the first period, then production succeeds with probability
ph and fails with probability (1 − ph). If he does not exert effort, the probabilities are
pl < ph and (1 − pl) respectively. If first period production was not successful, then
second period production cannot take place, the model ends, the manager loses his job
and the value of the firm is zero. If first period production was successful, then there
are two possibilities. Either production continues for a second period or production is
stopped after the first period and the manager loses his job. The gross values of the
firm, i.e. without taking into account managerial pay, are γα > 1 and 1 respectively.
The decision whether to continue production or not at t=1 is taken by headquarters.
Our model captures a situation where initial managerial moral hazard affects the
probability of attaining future profitable production stages. For example, a hard working
manager is more likely to maintain the quality of the assets he is in charge of. Machines
that are not properly looked after break down more often and cannot be used for future
production. In that case, production must be stopped and the manager is fired. For
simplicity, we assume that the value of the division is zero and nothing can be paid to
the manager. In contrast, well maintained machinery may be used for future production
leading to a final firm value of γα at t=2 or, alternatively, may be liquidated early at
t=1 and sold to other users for a value of 1.
4Gautier and Wauthy [2007] consider a related multi-tasking problem where competing managers
must raise money and develop valuable investment opportunities.
5The intermediate production result after the first period is observable but not con-
tractible. The decision of what to do with the assets belongs to headquarters who,
as the owner of assets, has the residual control rights over their use (see Grossman
and Hart [1986] and Gertner, Scharfstein and Stein [1994]).5 In the case of a
single-division firm, headquarters’ control rights are modeled here as the decision either
to continue production or to stop production and liquidate assets early.
The liquidation values 1 (early, at t=1, after success in the first period and stopping
production) and γα > 1 (late, at t=2, after success in the first period and continu-
ing production) result from a sale of assets to other users and are contractible. The
incentive contract that headquarters gives to the divisional manager therefore specifies
two payments. A payment w out of γα when his successful division is continued and a
payment s out of 1 when his successful division is liquidated. Nothing can be paid if his
division was unsuccessful in the first period. We call the payment s severance pay, since
it compensates the manager for early liquidation and being fired although first period
production was successful. Headquarters can use the severance pay to commit ex ante
not to inefficiently liquidate a successful division ex post.
Since we want to analyze the negative incentive effect of winner-picking by headquar-
ters on divisional managers in a conglomerate, our model has headquarters oversee two
divisions indexed i=1,2. The divisions are as just described. The only extra assumption
is that division 1’s production in the second period is more valuable than division 2’s
production: γ1α > γ2α, and for simplicity γ1 = γ and γ2 = 1. The difference across
divisions in the second period does not affect the structure of the moral hazard prob-
lem in the first period. The parameter γ measures the extra productivity of the strong
division 1 over the weak division 2, which is known to everybody from the beginning.
The divisions have identical and independent success probabilities (with and without
managerial effort), first period success means the same in both divisions, and their man-
agers have the same cost of effort. Having headquarters oversee two divisions who have
different future prospects allows it to engage in winner-picking, i.e. to redistribute scarce
resources towards the best use at t=1 (see Stein [1997]).
Divisions are identical in the first production period but they may not all succeed
at the same time. Table 1 shows headquarters’ possible actions (rows) in the different
cases it encounters (columns) at t=1. The likelihood of each case depends on divisional
managers’ efforts. When both divisions have succeeded in the first period, headquarters
can continue production in both. The gross value of the firm is γα + α. Instead,
headquarters could also stop production and realize gross values of γα + 1, α + 1 or 2
depending on whether it stops division 2, division 1 or both. When both divisions failed
in the first period, the value of the firm is zero.
Due to the scarcity of resources only one division can be continued when first period
production fails in one of the two divisions. But we allow headquarters to choose which
of the two divisions to continue. Since we assume that second period production is
5The ownership of assets, and hence having unconditional residual control rights, distinguishes head-
quarters from a single outside financier, e.g. a bank, which only owns production assets in the case of
bankruptcy. These unconditional control rights cannot be contracted away to a third party. They also
give headquarters incentives to be well informed about its division(s) (see also Stein [1997]).
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more valuable in division 1, headquarters will never want to continue the weak division
2 when only the strong division 1 succeeded. The interesting case (in italics) therefore
occurs when the strong division 1 failed and the weak division 2 succeeded. In that case,
headquarters has the possibility of winner-picking, i.e. to continue division 1 and realize
a gross value of γα instead of continuing division 2 for a gross value of α < γα.
Our model describes the situation in which headquarters can redeploy assets that
have maintained a sufficient level of quality - managerial effort makes this more likely - in
order to be used for further production. The redeployability of assets across divisions has
been identified as a major advantage of conglomerates and their internal capital markets
(see Gertner, Scharfstein and Stein [1994]). If headquarters has redeployed the
assets of a division, then the assets are no longer in place in that division to reach the
second production stage. As in the case of failure, the division is shut down and the
divisional manager is fired. The value of the division is zero and nothing can be paid to
the divisional manager.
For example, a manufacturer of electronic goods may have a division producing per-
sonal computers and another one producing mobile phones. Suppose that the mobile-
phone division has better prospects but its machines have broken down and cannot be
used for future production. The machines of the computer division, however, have not
not broken down and can be used for production, either of computers or of mobile-
phones (e.g. the machines are used to manufacture integrated circuits). In this case,
headquarters could decide to transfer the machines from the computer division to the
mobile-phone division. Of course, this means that production in the computer division
has to be stopped, since its machines have been taken away. The manager of the com-
puter division loses his job despite good performance while the manager of mobile-phone
division keeps his job despite bad performance.6
The ownership of the assets of more than one division enhances headquarters’ con-
trol rights at t=1. In addition to continue or stop a successful division, it can now
6We assume that headquarters cannot access external capital markets to buy additional assets.
Without scarce resources there is no scope for winner picking. Scharfstein and Stein [2000] show
how an agency problem between outside investors and headquarters affects the agency problem between
headquarters and divisional managers. Inderst and Mu¨ller [2003] consider the difference between
single- and multidivision firms with respect to debt finance. De Motta [2003] argues that divisional
managers may free-ride on the perception of the multidivision firm as a whole when accessing external
capital markets.
7also redeploy assets. That is, headquarters can stop a successful division in order to
continue a failed division. Instead of selling assets to outside users it can transfer them
internally. We are interested in the incentive effect for divisional managers of enhancing
headquarters’ control rights to engage in winner-picking by redeploying assets.
It is important to recall that only the liquidation values 1 (from early liquidation
at t=1) and γα or α (from late liquidation at t=2) are contractible in our model.
Redeploying assets internally is observable but not contractible. In this key ingredient
of the model we follow Gertner, Scharfstein and Stein [1994] and Stein [1997].
It would be difficult for an outside court to verify the internal transfer of assets in a
conglomerate. To come back to our example, suppose that second period production
takes place in the mobile-phone division only. It not possible to write an incentive
contract, enforceable by outsiders, that distinguishes whether the production used well-
maintained machines from the mobile-phone or from the computer division. Although
second period production does not take place in the computer division (since its assets
have be redeployed), it is impossible to ascertain for outsiders whether this was not
caused by machines having broken down in that division.
We consider first a benchmark case in section 3. Suppose that the firm is a portfolio
of two single-division firms so that assets cannot be redeployed. Given that the proba-
bilities of success of first period production are independent across divisions, the optimal
incentive contract exposes a manager only to the performance of his own division.7 As
in the single division case, the contract specifies a wage wi out of the continuation value
of division i: γα for division 1 and α for division 2. The contract also specifies severance
pay si to compensate a manager for being fired after the early liquidation of his success-
ful division. As in the single-divisional case, the severance pay is a modeling device to
ensure that a successful division is not inefficiently liquidated. Without the severance
pay there may be inefficient liquidation, clouding the incentive effect of winner-picking.
The impact of inefficient liquidation on ex ante behavior is not specific to multidivision
firms and has been examined elsewhere in the literature (see for example Bolton and
Scharfstein [1990] and Gertner, Scharfstein and Stein [1994]).
In order to expose the adverse incentive effect of winner-picking in sections 4 and 5,
we continue to base a manager’s pay only on the performance of his own division but
allow assets to be redeployed. The key inefficiency is due to the inability to contract on
the transfer of assets. In particular, the incentives of the manager of the strong division
1 weaken, since he anticipates that his division will be continued even when it fails in
the first period. The incentives of the manager of the weak division 2, however, do not
weaken. Although he is paid less often (because production in his division is stopped
and he is fired when assets are redeployed), headquarters will compensate for that loss
by paying him more when it does not need to redeploy the assets of his division. Given
that the divisions are technologically independent and that headquarters may not always
want to redistribute resources, it is clear that linear contracts based on total firm value
7This is an immediate application of Holmstro¨m’s [1979] informativeness principle. If, there how-
ever were some shock to the values of both divisions and this shock were contractible, (e.g. industry
wide factors driving also the value of competitors), then there would be a scope for relative performance
pay to filter out this shock.
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cannot be optimal. In section 7 we therefore ask whether complex, non-linear contracts,
or simpler but subjective incentive arrangements such as bonus pools, can eliminate the
agency cost of winner-picking.
Figure 1 summarizes the sequence of events in our model.
3 Single-division firms
In this section we explore the moral hazard problem between headquarters and its man-
ager in a firm with only one strong division with a final liquidation value of γα. In
that case, there cannot be any winner-picking and we show that there is no inefficient
liquidation and no agency cost over and above the normal rent the agent must earn in
a standard moral hazard problem.
To fix ideas, we first present a hypothetical first-best situation: what if there was
no moral hazard problem? Then, we move to the second-best situation where there is
moral hazard. Lastly, we introduce a reference point - a portfolio of two independent
single division firms - to be able to assess the value consequences of winner-picking later
on.
3.1 First Best: No moral hazard
If there was no moral hazard, it is as if headquarters performed the effort itself. Head-
quarters therefore fully internalizes the impact of its investment decision.
Consider first headquarters’ decision at t=1 to continue or to stop production. If
the division did not succeed, then there is no choice: production cannot be continued.
If headquarters exerted effort at cost c and the division succeeded, it obtains γα − c
from continuation and 1− c from stopping. If instead it exerted no effort, it obtains γα
and 1 respectively. Since γα > 1, a successful division is always continued. Consider
next headquarters’ effort decision at t=0.5. Headquarters knows that it will continue a
successful division and thus exerts effort if and only if phγα − c ≥ plγα. We therefore
have the following result:
9Proposition 1 In a firm with one strong division only and no moral hazard, successful
first-period production is always continued. Effort occurs if (ph − pl)γα ≥ c.
3.2 Second Best: Simple managerial moral hazard
We now turn to case when there is moral hazard, i.e., the manager must be incentivized to
exert effort. As usual, we proceed backwards and first analyze headquarters’ investment
decision at t=1.
Again, if production failed in the first period, headquarters has no choice. But if
it was successful, headquarters can either continue production for a second period and
obtain the value net of payment w to the manager, γα−w, or it can stop production and
obtain the value net of severance pay 1− s. At t=1, headquarters therefore continues a
successful division if the following continuation constraint is met:
(1) γα− w ≥ 1− s
The continuation pay w and the severance pay s that headquarters chooses ex ante to
incentivize its manager clearly affect its ex post investment decision.
In order to determine the incentive pay for the manager, we must turn to his incentive
to exert effort at t=0.5. The incentive depends on headquarters’ investment decision at
t=1. Conditional on headquarters continuing a successful division, the manager exerts
effort if:
phw − c ≥ plw
Conditional on headquarters stopping a successful division (equation (1) does not hold),
the manager exerts effort if:
phs− c ≥ pls
Note that the manager is only paid if first-period production succeeds. If it fails, the
value is zero and nothing can be paid to him.
Consider first the case of liquidating a successful division at t=1. Headquarters can
always commit to do so with w = γα. If it wants to induce managerial effort it sets
s = c
ph−pl which yields expected profits ph −
ph
ph−pl c. If it does not want to induce effort,
it sets s = 0 which yields expected profits pl.
Consider next the case of continuing a successful division at t=1. Headquarters can
always commit to do so with s = 1. If it wants to induce managerial effort it sets
w = c
ph−pl which yields expected profits phγα −
ph
ph−pl c. If it does not want to induce
effort, it sets w = 0 which yields expected profits plγα.
Comparing profits, we reach the following proposition.
Proposition 2 In a firm with one strong division only and moral hazard, successful
first-period production is always continued. Effort occurs if (ph − pl)γα ≥ phph−pl c.
The first part of proposition 2 shows that headquarters’ ex post investment decision
remains efficient even in the presence of managerial moral hazard. The intuition is that
by granting maximal severance pay to its manager, s = 1, headquarters can perfectly
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commit to continue a successful division for a second period. Similarly, with w = γα,
headquarters can perfectly commit to stop a successful division should it wish to do so.
The second part of proposition 2 describes the agency cost due to moral hazard.
Compared to the first-best in proposition 1 it is more costly to have effort. The man-
ager must be left with some rent, ph
c
ph−pl − c > 0. Note that the rent is independent of
headquarters’ investment decision. In a single-division firm with explicit incentive con-
tracting, it is possible to separate ex ante incentive from ex post investment decisions.
3.3 A reference point: no winner-picking, no extra agency costs
In order to assess the value consequences of winner-picking, we need a reference point.
Our benchmark is a portfolio of two independent single-division firms, a strong firm 1
and a weak firm 2 with respective second period production values of γα and α. To keep




The combined value of one strong and one weak firm, is:
(2) V ∗ = V1 + V2 = phγα + phα− 2ph c
ph − pl
where phc/(ph − pl) is the expected payment to a manager.
In the subsequent analysis, we will use the value V ∗ as a benchmark to assess the
value consequences of having a multidivision firm. Using V ∗ assumes that there cannot
be any redistribution of scarce resources unless several divisions are grouped together in
one firm. Despite this bias in favor of winner-picking, we will show that headquarters’
ability to pick winners can destroy value due to larger incentive costs.
4 Multidivision firm: No winner-picking
We will show shortly that winner-picking creates an agency cost. However, headquar-
ters does not necessarily have to pick winners. If the incentive cost of winner-picking
outweighs its investment benefit, then perhaps headquarters could simply decide not to
pick winners?
In this section, we show that there are costs even if headquarters decides not to pick
winners. The reason is that headquarters must increase managerial pay to commit to a
no-redistribution policy.
4.1 Headquarters’ investment decision
There are four situations that headquarters can encounter at t=1 after the first pro-
duction period. Either both divisions have succeeded, or just the strong division 1 or
the weak division 2 has succeeded, or neither division has succeeded. In each situation
headquarters has the investment choices shown in the rows of table 1.
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In order to carry out a policy of no-redistribution it must be optimal for headquar-
ters to continue production at t=1 for another period in each division whenever it has
succeeded in the first period:
γα− w1 ≥ 1− s1,
α− w2 ≥ 1− s2.
These conditions are the continuation constraints that we already encountered in the
analysis of a single-division firm (equation (1)) and, likewise, headquarters will set the
maximum severance pay si = 1 in order to commit not to stop a successful division.
Moreover, if headquarters wants to carry out a policy of no redistribution then it
must also be optimal to continue a successful division instead of transferring its assets
to the other division:
γα− w1 ≥ α− w2,
α− w2 ≥ γα− w1.
4.2 Managers’ effort decision
Given that headquarters does not redistribute resources between production periods at
t=1, the manager of division i exerts effort when:
phwi − c ≥ plwi.
In a multidivision firm where divisions are technologically independent, incentive pay
is contingent on divisional performance and headquarters does not pick winners, the
managerial incentive problem is therefore the same as in a single-division firm.
4.3 Interaction of incentives and not picking winners
We now ask: When headquarters does not redistribute resources between the production
periods, can the value of the firm be lower than V ∗? Given the optimality of effort
(assumption 1), it suffices to consider the case when both managers exert effort. If they
did not, then the value of the firm without winner-picking would automatically be lower
than V ∗.
At t=0, headquarters therefore solves:
max
wi
ph(γα− w1) + ph(α− w2)(3)
subject to:





A priori, headquarters wants to minimize the rent given to divisional managers by
setting w1 = w2 =
c
ph−pl . However this is not feasible, due to the transfer constraint, since
γ > 1. With equal wages headquarters would find it profitable to transfer the resources
from a successful weak division to an unsuccessful strong division (which happens with
probability (1 − ph)ph). Thus, headquarters must leave an extra rent to the manager
of the strong division over and above what is necessary to induce his effort in order to
commit not to redistribute. We therefore have:
Proposition 3 No redistribution always does worse than the benchmark V ∗.
To ease the transfer constraint, headquarters could decide not to induce effort in the
weak division 2. Saving managerial rent in the weak division makes it more attractive to
leave the assets in the weak division. The advantage is that the manager of the strong
division 1 can be given a smaller rent. The disadvantage is that without effort, a division
fails more often making second period production less likely in the first place.
Proposition 4 If headquarters does not redistribute, then having effort only in the
strong division is preferred to having effort in both divisions when α < α∗ = 2ph c(ph−pl)2







Proof in Appendix A.1
Figure 2 illustrates the proposition. When implementing a no-redistribution policy,
headquarters does not incentivize the manager of the weak division when the overall
profitability is weak (low α) and the difference between the divisions’ profitability is
large enough (high γ).8
5 Multidivision firm: Winner-picking
This section repeats the analysis of the previous section, except that now headquarters
does redistribute resources to pick a winner.
5.1 Headquarters’ investment decision
As described in the previous section, headquarters can encounter four situations after
the first production period at t=1 (see table 1). If headquarters wants to carry out a
policy of redistribution, we need to reconsider its decision when the strong division 1
failed but the weak division 2 succeeded. The choice now is between i) continuing the
successful weak division 2 (obtaining α−w2), ii) stopping and liquidating it (obtaining
8The dashed curve separates two different regimes in which headquarters does not incentivize the
manager of the weak division. Above this curve, headquarters overcompensates the manager in the
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12No effort in the weak division
Overcompensation of manager
in the weak division
1− s2) and iii) transferring its assets to the unsuccessful strong division 1, i.e., winner-
picking (obtaining γα − w1). For winner-picking to be optimal, we therefore have the
following transfer constraints:
γα− w1 ≥ α− w2,
γα− w1 ≥ 1− s2.
In addition, the usual continuation constraints continue to apply. And, again, headquar-
ters sets si = 1 to ease the continuation and transfer constraints.
5.2 Managers’ effort decision
Under winner-picking, the manager of the strong division 1 is always refinanced unless
both divisions fail. Conditional on effort in division 2, the manager in division 1 exerts
effort when:
(4) [ph + (1− ph)ph]w1 − c ≥ [pl + (1− pl)ph]w1,
and conditional on no effort in division 2, he exerts effort when:
(5) [ph + (1− ph)pl]w1 − c ≥ [pl + (1− pl)pl]w1.
The situation of the manager in the weak division 2 is different. He only attains the
second production period, and is paid w2, if his division 2 and and the strong division
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1 produced resources in the first period, so that the latter does not need the former’s
resources. Conditional on effort in the strong division 1, the manager of the weak division
2 exerts effort when:
(6) p2hw2 − c ≥ phplw2,
and conditional on no effort in division 1, he exerts effort when:
(7) plphw2 − c ≥ p2lw2.
Proposition 5 shows that when compensation is based on divisional performance, winner-
picking makes it more difficult to induce effort in the strong but not in the weak division.
Proposition 5 Winner-picking leads to an additional agency cost: the manager in the
strong division who gains resources requires a larger rent to exert effort than in a single-
division firm. The manager of the weak division who loses resources requires the same
rent as in a single-division firm to exert effort.
Proof in Appendix A.2
The key is that winner-picking introduces extra noise into incentive contracting. It
is not possible for incentive purposes to ascertain ex post in a verifiable way whether
production in the strong division continued because of previous success in that division
or because of previous success elsewhere in conjunction with redistribution. Incentives
in a weak division are unaffected since production in a weak division continues only if
there has been previous success in that division.
Our assumptions on contractability and incentive contracts isolate this incentive
cost of winner-picking. Allowing for explicit incentive contracting shows that the cost is
not due to an inefficient decision to liquidate. Headquarters can use the payment si to
commit not to liquidate inefficiently. Inefficient liquidation has been examined elsewhere
in the literature and is not specific to multidivision firms (see for example Bolton and
Scharfstein [1990] and Gertner, Scharfstein and Stein [1994]). Allowing for
explicit incentive contracting also shows that the incentive cost of winner-picking is not
due to taking resources away from a successful division. The payment wi can be used to
make up for the expected loss by paying the manager more when his division succeeded in
the first period and its assets are not transferred elsewhere. Again, the adverse incentive
effect of taking resources away ex post has been examined elsewhere in the context of
both single-division firms (Gertner, Scharfstein and Stein [1994], Aghion and
Tirole [1997]) as well as multidivision ones (Brusco and Panunzi [2005]).
5.3 Interaction of incentives and picking winners
Suppose that headquarters wants to induce effort in both divisions. Given the new




(ph + (1− ph)ph)(γα− w1) + p2h(α− w2)(8)
subject to:
γα− w1 ≥ α− w2 (Transfer Constraint)
w1 ≥ 11−ph cph−pl
w2 ≥ 1ph cph−pl
(Incentive Constraints)
Disregard the transfer constraint for a moment so that w1 and w2 are given by the
incentive constraints. The value of the multidivision firm that transfers funds, where
both managers exert effort and are not overcompensated is:




ph − pl − ph
c
ph − pl .
The first and second term are the expected benefit from second period production in the
strong and weak division, respectively. The third and fourth term are the expected cost
of inducing effort in the strong and the weak division. Redistribution has no effect on
the cost in the weak division but it increases the cost in the strong division by a factor
1 + 1
1−ph .
The multidivision firm does better than the benchmark when V tee > V
∗, i.e. when:
(10) (1− ph)ph(γ − 1)α > ph
1− ph
c
ph − pl .
The term on the left-hand side is the benefit of winner-picking. With probability
(1 − ph)ph there are only resources in the weak division and by redistributing them,
headquarters raises productivity from α to γα. The term on the right-hand side is the
agency cost of winner-picking. It is more difficult to incentivize the manager of the
strong division since he knows that headquarters will always bail him out.
When is V tee feasible? Again, headquarters sets s1 = s2 = 1 in order to satisfy the
continuation constraints. Suppose that w1 and w2 are given by the binding incentive
constraints. The transfer constraint is then satisfied if:







If this condition does not hold, then w2 is given by the transfer constraint and the second
incentive constraint is slack.9 It immediately follows that
Proposition 6 If headquarters redistributes and induces effort in both divisions, it
must overcompensate the manager of the weak division 2 if (11) does not hold.
9Note that condition (11) is always satisfied if ph ≤ 1/2. In that case, the optimal payments are
such that w1 < w2 and the binding incentive constraints never violate the transfer constraint. In the
remainder of the paper we assume that ph > 1/2.
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Both managers exert effort
No effort in strong division
Both managers exert effort
Overcompensation of manager
in weak division
As before, headquarters may choose not to induce effort by one manager. In order
to facilitate winner-picking, it may choose to not incentivize the manager of the strong
division. Again, the cost of no managerial effort is that his division is less likely to
succeed in the first period. In contrast, there are now two benefits. Not only will it ease
the transfer constraint, but there will also be no incentive cost of winner-picking in the
strong division.10
Proposition 7 describes the efficient effort policy in a conglomerate that picks winners.
Proposition 7 If headquarters redistributes, then having effort only in the weak divi-























. Headquarters always induces effort in the weak
division.
Proof in Appendix A.3
Figure 3 illustrates propositions 6 and 7.
Under winner-picking, headquarters does not incentive the manager of the strong
division when the overall profitability α is low and the difference between the divisions’
profitability γ is not too large. When the difference across divisions is small but the
overall profitability is large, then headquarters wants both managers to exert effort. But
10The benefit is reduced if less pay is needed to incentivize the manager of the strong division, e.g.,
if managerial ability is correlated with the productivity of his division (or if first and second period
productivity are positively correlated). Hence, headquarters may be able to increase the value of the
firm if managerial talent is matched to investment opportunities.
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to commit to picking the winner in this situation may require an overcompensation of
the manager of the weak division.
6 Comparisons
Propositions 4 and 7 describe the optimal effort policy of a multidivision firm without
and with winner-picking respectively. In this section, we combine the results to describe
when winner-picking is optimal in a multidivision firm (proposition 8), and confront the
resulting value of the multidivision firm with the benchmark value V ∗ (proposition 9).
Proposition 8 In a multidivision firm, no redistribution does better than winner-
picking if γ < Min
[
ph(2−pl)
ph+pl(1−ph) − 1α cph−pl
ph









Proof in Appendix A.4
Figure 4 shows the optimal investment and incentive policies in a multidivision firm.
For all levels of the overall profitability α there is an upper bound (solid curves) for the
difference between the divisions’ profitability γ below which headquarters prefers not to
pick winners in order avoid the associated incentive costs. Without winner-picking both
managers always exert effort. Above this threshold, headquarters does pick winners.
Under winner-picking there are two incentive regimes (separated by the dashed curve,
which is given by the first term in the Max expression of proposition 7). For a low level
of overall profitability α, only the manager of the weak division exerts effort. For a high
level of α, both managers exert effort.
In a multidivision firm, there are costs associated with both no redistribution and
redistribution. If headquarters does not pick winners then the value of the firm is
always lower than the benchmark V ∗ since it is costly to commit to not redistribute.
If headquarters does pick winners then either it has to suffer larger incentive costs or
it does not incentivize the manager of the strong division. The next proposition shows
the condition under which a conglomerate with an efficient internal capital market does
worse than the portfolio of independent single-division firms.




pl(1−ph) − 1α cph−pl
ph









Proof in Appendix A.5
Figure 5 illustrates proposition 9. It is similar to figure 4. The difference is that the
curves bounding γ from below in proposition 9 lie strictly above the curves that provide
the upper bound on γ in proposition 8. The reason is that the value of a conglomerate
that does not redistribute is always lower than the benchmark value V ∗ (proposition 3).
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Figure 4














































No winner-picking: both managers exert effort
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Multi-div. firm (winner-picking) does better than
portfolio of single-div. firms





Multi-div. firm does worse than portfolio of single-div. firms
Multi-div. firm (winner-
picking) does better 
than portfolio of 
single-div. firms
No effort in strong 
division
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7 Managerial incentive contracts
The agency cost of winner-picking in our model arises because an incentive contract
based on the value of the division, while optimal in the case of no redistribution, does
not specify different payments in the case in which the manager of the strong division
was successful in producing resources and the case in which he was unsuccessful but
his division receives the resources from the weak division (winner-picking). In this
section, we consider alternative incentive structures, e.g., non-linear contracts based on
the overall value of the firm and bonus pools, to explore the robustness of our results.
Empirical evidence suggest that various incentive structures are used in multidivision
firms. But the largest source of managerial compensation is tied to divisional perfor-
mance as assumed so far in this paper. Bushman, Indjejikian and Smith [1995] and
Wulf [2002] both use information about incentives consisting of survey data on bonuses
for managers at different levels of the corporate hierarchy and the extent to which these
bonuses are determined by performance at different levels (e.g., plant, division, overall
firm). Bushman, Indjejikian and Smith [1995] show that for the median divisional
manager, 50% of his pay is determined by performance at the divisional level (Wulf
[2002] finds a similar value), while only 15% of his pay is determined by performance at
the overall corporate level. The remaining proportion of bonuses is determined by other
e.g., individual performance measures. These numbers provide support for our assump-
tion that divisional managers’ pay depends on the performance of their own divisions.
Aggarwal and Samwick [2003] provide further supporting evidence by showing that
the ”pay for divisional performance” for divisional managers is higher than for CEOs.
Moreover, the precision of divisional performance increases divisional managers’ pay for
divisional performance but decreases their pay for overall firm performance.
7.1 Contracts based on the overall value of the firm
Consider a contract that specifies a different payment wi,v to the manager of division i
for each of the two firm values possible under redistribution at t=2: v = γα, γα + α.11
We know from proposition 5 that redistribution does not create an additional agency
cost in the weak division if its manager’s pay is based only on the value of his own
division: w2,γα = 0 and w2,γα+α =
c
ph(ph−pl) . Such a contract effectively pays the manager
of the weak division only if his own division and the strong one both have succeeded at
t=1 so that there is no need for headquarters to redistribute resources.
To avoid the agency cost of winner-picking in the strong division, its manager should
only be paid when he succeeds and when he does not need a transfer of resources from
the weak division: w1,γα = 0 and w1,γα+α =
c
ph(ph−pl) . Such a contract does not pay
the manager of the strong division according to the performance of his own division but
effectively links his pay to the success of the weak division.
Such an incentive scheme may however increase the tension between investment and
incentives in a conglomerate as it makes the continuation of two successful divisions less
11Nothing can be paid if both divisions failed and the value of the firm is zero. Furthermore, the firm
value α never occurs under redistribution.
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attractive. Headquarters may be tempted to liquidate a successful weak division in order
to avoid paying the manager of the strong division. Such a liquidation would reduce
the value of the firm from γα+ α (where managers are paid) to γα (where they are not
paid). Formally, the constraint guaranteeing the continuation of two successful divisions
relative to continuing only a successful strong division is:
γα− w1,γα+α + α− w2,γα+α ≥ γα− w1,γα + 1− s2
With pay based on divisional performance only, we had w1,γα+α = w1,γα. Now we have
w1,γα+α > w1,γα = 0 in order to avoid the agency cost of redistribution in the strong
division. Headquarters prefers to continue two successful division only if:
α ≥ 2 c
ph(ph − pl)
where we set s2 = 1 to make the liquidation of the weak division less attractive. A
policy of redistribution with effort in both divisions can no longer be implemented at
low levels of the overall profitability α.
In addition, the above contract, which avoids the incentive cost of winner-picking by
paying managers only when the overall value of the firm is highest, exposes managers
to considerable income risk, especially as the number of divisions increases. If managers
dislike risk, then headquarters would face an additional trade-off between insurance and
incentives in a multidivision firm. More generally, there appear to be limits to the
complexity of explicit incentive structures in multidivision firms. Bushman, Indje-
jikian and Smith [1995] for example argue that multidivision firms do not condition a
divisional manager’s pay on the full vector of the performance of all the firm’s divisions.
7.2 Bonus pool
Because general optimal contracts based on firm and/or divisional value may turn out to
be quite complex, headquarters could instead use a flexible bonus pool to overcome the
incentive cost of winner-picking. In our analysis, we assume that the intermediate pro-
duction results within a multidivision firm are not-contractible. For example, it would
difficult for an outside court to ascertain which division was successful in maintaining
the quality of its machinery so that it can be used for a second production period. Inter-
mediate production results are, however, observable within the firm since headquarters
uses this information to engage in winner-picking. Thus, headquarters can use this in-
formation also to allocate bonuses to managers. Murphy and Oyer [2003] document
that subjective performance evaluation is more important for determining business-unit
manager than CEO pay. They also show that business-unit manager pay tends be be
more based on business-unit rather than firm-wide performance.
Consider then the following incentive arrangement: headquarters specifies that it will
allocate a bonus pool equal to c
ph−pl if one division is continued and equal to 2
c
ph−pl if two
divisions are continued. That is, the bonus pool is proportional to the overall value of
the firm. The allocation of the bonus pool across divisional managers is not specified and
is left at headquarters’ discretion. As headquarters has no preference about who receives
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what fraction of the bonus pool, it will allocate it based on the observed performance at
t=1. Headquarters can therefore give a bonus to those managers who succeeded in the
first production period. Since the success of a division in the first period is a sufficient
statistic for managerial effort (continuing to assume that the probability of success is
independent across divisions), such a bonus is an efficient way to provide incentives.
An incentive mechanism using bonuses requires that headquarters has a reputation
for promoting those divisional managers who are successful at the interim stage and not
those who are successful at the last stage after winner-picking may have taken place.
Reputation, corporate culture and the separation of incentive from capital budgeting
decisions, are therefore an important element for bonus schemes to work. Also, re-
wards given at headquarters’ discretion may not be immune to collusion or lobbying by
managers. Rent-seeking activities might be particularly important in a conglomerate
because headquarters has some discretion over the allocation of resources and because
managers may be evaluated not on their absolute but their relative performance to
others. Scharfstein and Stein [2000] and Rajan, Servaes and Zingales [2000]
develop models where managers in multi-division firms inefficiently invest in rent-seeking
activities. Using contracts based on the divisions’ value, imperfect as they may be, may
therefore be seen as a credible means to limit headquarters’ discretion and thus curb
inefficient influence activities by managers.
8 Conclusion
This paper argues that winner-picking, i.e. the efficient redistribution of scarce resources
across divisions in an internal capital market of a multidivision firm, creates an incentive
cost. Winner-picking adds noise to the moral hazard problem of incentivizing divisional
managers to produce the resources that can subsequently be redistributed by headquar-
ters.
While the previous literature focuses on the expropriation of managers in losing
divisions, we point to the free-riding by managers in winning divisions. In our set-up,
the expropriation of the manager in a losing division can be compensated financially by
using explicit incentive contracts. These managers end up being paid more less often.
However, with incentive contracts based on divisional value, it is impossible to eliminate
the free-riding of the manager in a winning division on the resources produced in a losing
division. Headquarters cannot write incentive contracts that distinguish managerial luck
from skill, i.e. the standard moral hazard problem, and whether an unlucky manager
in a division with good investment opportunities is bailed out with resources from a
division with poor investment opportunities.
In the paper, we discuss three different types of incentive schemes. Each of them is
associated with a trade-off between investment and incentive decisions. Contracts based
on the value of a manager’s own division create an incentive cost of winner picking.
Contracts based on the overall value of the firm, or the full vector of divisional perfor-
mance, are complex, expose the manager to considerable income risk and may induce
headquarters to inefficiently liquidate divisions. Bonuses paid at headquarters discretion
could overcome the contractual restrictions of explicit incentive contracts, but may in
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turn be subject to influence activities and reputation concerns. In practice, one observes
all three types of incentive structures. Their mix will depend on their relative cost in
relation to the investment opportunities of a multidivision firm.
In our analysis, we consider a multidivision firm whose divisions are technologically
independent. In this case, a strong division must be sufficiently productive in order
for the reallocation benefit of winner-picking to outweigh its incentive cost. The result
is consistent with evidence that unrelated diversification hurts performance, especially
when investment prospects are similar across divisions, (see for example Montgomery
and Wernerfelt [1988], Comment and Jarrel [1995] and Rajan, Servaes and
Zingales [2000]). Our result can thus display a conglomerate discount despite winner-
picking and without assuming a form of ”corporate socialism”, i.e. an ex post inefficient
redistribution of resources for which the evidence is mixed (see Khanna and Tice
[2001] and Maksimovic and Phillips [2002]).
When divisions are no longer technologically independent, then the relative benefit
and cost of winner-picking change. If a multidivision firm has divisions that operate in
similar business areas (related diversification), then it is more likely that the divisions
all succeed or fail at the same time. In this case, the scope for picking winners is lower.
But the incentive cost is lower too since it is tied to the availability of funds elsewhere in
the conglomerate. A fruitful avenue for future research would therefore be a model that
would evaluate the reallocation benefit and the incentive cost of winner-picking, and
hence to optimal size and scope of an internal capital market, as well as the structure of
incentive contracts, in relation to the degree of diversification of the conglomerate. Along
these lines, Gautier and Wauthy [2007] show that incentive problems exacerbate
when the number of division increases. Stein [1997] shows that the optimal degree
of focus of a conglomerate depends on a trade-off between diversifying risk and the
quality of the relative performance assessment made by headquarters. Empirically, the
relationship between conglomerate value and an appropriate measure of diversification
are mixed. Montgomery and Wernerfelt [1988] and Comment and Jarrel
[1995] find evidence that unrelated diversification hurts conglomerate performance while
Rumelt [1982], Berger and Ofek [1995] and Khanna and Tice [2001] find support
for the opposite.
Appendix
A.1 Proof of proposition 4
To solve the program (3), headquarters sets s1 = s2 = 1 and w2 =
c
(ph−pl) and w1 is
given by the transfer constraint. The value of the firm is:
V nteoe = 2phα− 2ph
c
ph − pl .
If headquarters wants to induce effort in the strong division only then it sets s1 = s2 = 1
and solves the following program:
max
w1,w2
phγα + plα− phw1 − plw2
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subject to w1 ≥ cph−pl , cph−pl > w2 ≥ 0 and γα− w1 = α− w2.
When γ ≥ 1 + 1
α
c
ph−pl , the solution to this program is w1 = (γ − 1)α and w2 = 0
leading to a firm value of:
V nteon = (ph + pl)α.
When γ ≤ 1 + 1
α
c
ph−pl , the solution is w1 =
c
ph−pl and w2 =
c
ph−pl − (γ − 1)α and the
value of the firm is:
V nteno = (ph + pl)γα− (ph + pl)
c
ph − pl .



















Given assumption 1, having effort in the weak division only or no effort in both
divisions is always dominated by having effort in both divisions.
A.2 Proof of proposition 5
In a single-division firm, a manager requires an expected payment ph
c
ph−pl to exert effort.
With redistribution, the smallest continuation reward that motivates managers is given
when the incentive constraints (4) to (7) bind. The manager of the strong division then
receives an expected payment of (1 + 1
1−ph )ph
c
ph−pl if the manager of the weak division
exerts effort, or (1 + 1
1−pl )ph
c
ph−pl if he does not. If the manager of the weak division
exerts effort, he receives an expected payment of ph
c
ph−pl independent of whether the
manager of the strong division exerts effort or not.
A.3 Proof of proposition 7




ph−pl and w2 is
given by either the incentive or the transfer constraint depending on the condition of
proposition 6. In the first case the value of the firm is given by (9). In the second case,
w2 = −(γ − 1)α + 11−ph cph−pl and the value of the firm is:




ph − pl .
If headquarters wants to induce effort in the weak division only then it sets s1 = s2 = 1





ph−pl . The value of the firm then is:
(A1) V tne = (pl + (1− pl)ph)γα + plphα− ph
c
(ph − pl) .
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Suppose headquarters wants to induce effort only in the strong division. Under redistri-
bution it is more difficult to incentivize only the manager of the strong division than to
incentivize only the manager of the weak division (see proposition 5 and the preceding
analysis). But the benefit under redistribution is the same as if only the manager of
the weak division exerts effort. Moreover, it is always possible to induce effort in the
weak division only. Hence effort in the weak division only dominates effort in the strong
division only.
Given that i) it costs the same to induce effort in the weak division as in a single-
division firm (see proposition 5 and the preceding analysis) and ii) that effort is desirable
(assumption 1), no effort in both divisions is dominated by inducing effort in the weak
division only.
The question then is: when does headquarters prefer not to induce effort in the strong



























ph − pl + phpl .









For α < α∗∗, high effort in one division dominates if (A2) holds. Notice that in this case,
(11) holds. For α > α∗∗ it dominates if (A3) holds and in this case, (11) does not hold .
A.4 Proof of proposition 8
We have six values for the multidivision firm depending on whether there is redistribution










eeo . First, we note that
whenever V teeo is the outcome under redistribution, it is dominated by no-redistribution:
V teeo < V
nt
eoe. One condition for V
t












which always holds when (11) holds.
Similarly, whenever V nteon or V
nt
eno is the outcome under no-redistribution, it is domi-
nated by redistribution. Recall that V nteon is feasible if:
(A4) γ ≥ 1 + 1
α
c
ph − pl .
V nteon < V
t
ne holds when:






ph + pl − phpl ,
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which always holds when (A4) holds.









ph(ph − pl) ,
that is for all the parameters constellation where V nteno is feasible.





V nteoe > V
t
ne can be rewritten as:
γ <
ph(2− pl)






ph + pl(1− ph) ,
which is the first term in the Min expression. Next, V nteoe > V
t
ee can be rewritten as:






(2− ph)(1− ph) ,
which is the second term in theMin expression. Finally, it is easily verified that these two
conditions intersect at a point that lies on the curve describing the boundary between
V tne and V
t







, which is smaller than α∗∗.
A.5 Proof of proposition 9
When there is no winner-picking, the conglomerate’s value is strictly smaller than V ∗
(proposition 3). We are then left with two comparisons due to the two possible values
under winner-picking (see the proof of proposition 7): V tee > V
∗ and V tne > V
∗. We
have made the first comparison in (10). Rewriting (10) yields the second condition on
γ in the Min expression. Comparing V tne (from equation (A1)) to V
∗ yields the first
expression in the Min condition. Finally, the two conditions as well as condition (11)
(the boundary of V tee and V
t




1− pl + ph
)
c
(ph − pl)2 ,
which is smaller than αˆ.
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